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Abstract
The HMR model extends the classical gravity model of trade to correct for the large num-
ber of zeros in the world trade matrix (export selection) and for the unobservable fraction of
exporting rms (extensive margin). They nd that, while omission of both of these corrections
result in the biased estimates of the gravity model, the extensive margin correction is the most
signicant of the two when estimating the trade ows. I test the robustness of this conclusion
by splitting the world trade data into OECD and non-OECD countries. The extensive margin
should be both economically and statistically more signicant for the OECD exporters, while
export selection should play a larger in the trade ows for the non-OECD exporters. I nd that
the extensive margin is not signicant for the OECD trade ows, but the export selection is
important regardless of the exporter location. These ndings call into question the conclusions
of the HMR model. I posit and test possible hypothesis to explain them.
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1 Introduction
The gravity model of trade is a workhorse model for the empirical estimation of the international
trade ows. In its usual form, the gravity model predicts the volume of trade between two countries
based on their economic sizes (often using GDP measurements). It has been also recognized that
the measure of the economic size is proportional to the measures of "trade resistance" between the
two countries1. Among others, these measures include: the geographic distance; a dummy for the
common border and language and a dummy for the membership in a trade agreement.
With the development of the rm-level heterogeneity theory pioneered by Melitz (2003) the
extended model by Helpman, Melitz and Rubenstein (HMR) (2008) allows to reconsider the sta-
tistical and economic signicance of estimates in the gravity model. Since the Melitz (2003) model
is capable of endogenously calculating the number of exporting rms in the market it becomes
possible to decompose the trade ows into the intensive margin (the volume of trade per rm) and
the extensive margin (the number of the exporting rms). Given the importance of the extensive
margin on the theoretical grounds, the failure to control for it in the classical gravity model calls
for questioning of its consistent estimation.
The underlying theory that is used to derive the classical gravity model treats each rm equally
as productive, so that each rm can become an exporter. Recognizing that this outcome is strongly
rejected by the data (50 percent of country pairs do not trade with each other) the HMR (2008)
model links determinants of the trade ows between countries with the rm-level heterogene-
ity.Using Melitz (2003) framework, the HMR model bridges rm-level heterogeneity with country-
level data by aggregating exports over varying distributions of rms that are productive enough
to become exporters. Thus, without any rm-level data it becomes possible to separately control
for the number of exporting rms as well for the volume of trade per exporting rm corrected for
the non-random export selection through the characteristics of the marginal exporters to di¤erent
destinations. Incorporating these controls allows to consistently estimate the gravity model. HMR
nds that while omission of both of these corrections result in the biased estimates of the gravity
model, the extensive margin correction is the most signicant of the two when estimating the trade
ows.
In this paper, I revisit the original HMR model, with an extension to test the robustness of
the extensive margin in the HMR estimation. In particular I investigate whether it is still the
case that the extensive margin remains both economically and statistically signicant in correcting
the rm-heterogeneity bias in the classical gravity model of trade when I split the world trade
data such that the extensive margin must theoretically overwhelm the rm export selection. My
methodology is similar to Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) in that I take the theoretical set up of the
HMR model as given, while amending the empirical specication. Keeping the theoretical set-up
unaltered, allows me to analyze the importance of the extensive margin at the rm level with the
use of the country-level data. I depart from the symmetric trading world in the HMR model and
1Tinbergen (1962) was the rst to recognize this proportionality.
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consider the world consisting of two regions: North and South. Countries in the North are assumed
OECD countries, while South countries are developing. This conguration allows for testing the
importance the extensive margin of trade in the basic HMR model in the the two important ways.
First, I extend the original HMR empirical specication, by introducing region of export origin
controls through interaction e¤ects. These region-barrier interaction e¤ects are aimed to capture
di¤erential e¤ects of the trade barriers on the trade volumes for the Northern and the Southern
exporters, which allows for a preliminary robustness check of the signicance of the extensive
margin relative to the export-selection with the world trade data split. Second, I divide the cross-
section sample into four groups based on trading partner location pairs: North-North, North-South,
South-North and South-South. For these location pairs, I estimate the original HMR model with
no interaction e¤ects and analyze the relative importance of the extensive margin to the non-
random export selection in the relation to the theoretical predictions. On the theoretical grounds
the extensive margin should be both economically and statistically more signicant for the OECD
exporters, while export selection should play a larger in the trade ows for the non-OECD exporters.
To preview my results, I nd that the HMR estimation results give too much credit for the
extensive margin in explaining biases in the standard gravity model. The extensive margin contin-
ues to be signicant but its magnitude falls considerably, while the magnitude of the non-random
selection rises. Importantly, when the trade data is split into four regions, I nd that the extensive
margin is not signicant for the North-South trading partners, which contradicts theoretical pre-
dictions. However, the export-selection appears to be important regardless of the exporter region.
Thus, while in the aggregate the extensive margin of trade is the main source of the biases in the
classical gravity model, once the trade ows are split the signicance and importance of the ex-
tensive marginal disappears. One of the possible explanations for this nding is that the extensive
margin largely depends on the elasticity of substitution. For the Southern countries, that primarily
export homogeneous varieties the elasticity of substitution between these varieties is high, making
the extensive margin an unimportant determinant of the trade ows. For the Northern countries,
my ndings are puzzling.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the inconsistencies in estimating
the classical gravity model, describe the main features of the HMR model and present the model
extension. In section 3, I describe the data used in my estimations. In section 4, I present all
estimation results. Section 5, then concludes. I also include two appendices. In the Appendix
A, I present the detailed derivation of the HMR model upon which I build my extension. In the
Appendix B, I state the denitions of all the variables used in the estimations. These appendices
are followed by the tables with estimation results and gures.
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2 An Extension of the HMR Model
2.1 Inconsistencies in Estimating the Classical Gravity Model
As discussed by Anderson and vanWincoop (2004) the estimating gravity equation has the following
general form:
xij = 1yi + 2yj +
MX
m=1
m ln(z
m
ij ) + "ij; (1)
where xij - volume of bilateral trade ows from j to i expressed in the natural logarithm; yj , yi -
GDP of exporter j and importer i respectively and zmij is a vector of the observable trade barriers.
The estimate of m captures the e¤ect of the intensive margin of trade - it predicts the negative
e¤ect of trade barriers on the trade volumes once j already exports to i:
Recently the estimation strategy of the gravity model has been challenged in the empirical
trade literature. This concern stems from stylized trade data analysis: over fty percent of all the
bilateral trade volumes are zero. Moreover, while the underlying assumption of the classical gravity
model is a symmetry in trade volumes between the trading partners (xij = xji), the data strongly
rejects such assumption. There exists asymmetric one-way trading relations such that xij > 0
and xji = 0 or vice versa. If there are gains from trade, than why does such regularity appear?
Traditionally, this issue was ignored by the researches, either by dropping the zero observations or
by only considering the bilateral trade between the developed countries. However, the non-random
nature of zeros in the trade matrix raises a concern of consistency in estimating m:
Ignoring the zeros in the trade matrix results in the inconsistent estimation of the gravity
model (1) for the two reasons. First, dropping or ignoring the zeros in the trade matrix results
in the selection bias. The selection bias is associated with unobserved (or not controlled for)
trade-barriers that are correlated with the observed trade barriers in zmij and are important in
explaining the volumes of bilateral trade ows. Hence the countries with large unobservable trade
barriers may not select into exporting. This explains the zeros in the trade matrix, but not for
the random reasons. Second, given that a country-pair selects into exporting, the trade ows may
be asymmetric. This can only happen if the fraction of exporters in these countries is di¤erent or
potentially zero. Failure to control for the fraction of exporters (the extensive margin) results in
heterogeneity bias. It confounds the e¤ects of trade barriers on rm-level trade with their e¤ects
on the proportion of exporting rms.
2.2 Extensive Margin and Trade Volumes
The main contribution of the HMR model is to derive the measure of the extensive trade margin
from the structural theoretical model. The HMR model2 is an application of the Melitz (2003)
model with few simplications: no domestic production and no dynamics of entry and exit. If only
2The detailed derivation of the HMR model is provided in the Appendix A
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some fraction of the rms in country j choose to export, choose to export, this can only happen if
these rms can at least break even in terms their prots. While every rm in country j facing no
xed costs choose to serve its domestic market, the rms in country j that choose to export must
be productive enough (or operate at a low enough unit cost a) to cover xed trade-barrier costs
fij . This set-up results in the zero-prot condition (A7) that implicitly denes the minimum unit
cost cut-o¤ aij :
The HMR framework can be best shown graphically. Figure A highlights how the variation in
xed export costs a¤ects the selection of the rms in a country j into exporting3. The key departure
from the traditional Melitz (2003) model is the use of truncated distribution of the unit costs with
a cdf G(a) that has the support [aL;aH ] such that aH > aL > 0: In this case the rms productivity
is 1 "  1=a, where " is an elasticity of substitution. The truncated distribution insures that there
are going to be mass of rms that will not be productive enough to export. Emprically the choice
of such distribution implies zero trade ows for some exporting rms. The fraction of rms that
choose to export is determined by the level of the xed export costs fij and the export cut-o¤ 1 "ij .
When the level of the xed costs is as high as f
0
ij (in the negative sense) no rms choose to export,
since none of the rms are productive enough to cover xed costs and make at least zero prots.
In this case (1 ")0ij < 
1 "
H : the least productive rm that nd it protable to export to country
i has a unit cost above the support of G(a). However, when the level of these costs is fij , some
fraction of the rms in a country j will export. This fraction is implicitly determined through the
bilateral trade volumes (A8) under the Melitz (2003) assumption that every rm produces exactly
one variety l and it is shown by the shaded region in the Figure A. The expression for export
volumes (A8) is the expected value of the fraction of all the rms that export from country j in the
interval [aL; aij ], where the unit cost a is drawn from a distribution with the CDF G(a). With the
assumed symmetric distribution, in the aggregate, the average rm in every country pair faces same
probability of being selected into export market. However, it can also be the case that no rms
will be productive enough to export from country j, but some rms will be able to export from
country i resulting in one-way trade ows. Thus, the HMR framework can successfully capture the
empirical regularities of the world trade data and provide a theoretical justication of the empirical
importance of the extensive margin in trade.
The derivation of the extensive trade margin measure Wij- fraction (possibly zero) of exporting
rms requires an assumption on the functional form for CDF of G(a). In the parametric form
HMR selects the truncated Pareto distribution (A11) as a functional form of G(a). While, they
show that choice of this distribution is not specic to the results, the measure that controls for the
fraction of exporters is based on the choice of this distribution and plays an important role in the
estimating results. Using this distribution the export volumes can be written as in equation (A12).
The measure of the fraction of the exporting rms is given by the expression for Wij . It is the ratio
of the bounded from the above productivity G(aij) that gives non-zero fraction of exporters. This
3Figure A shows the selection of rms into exporting in the country j. The export selection of the rms in the
country i (not shown) is constructed similarly.
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measure is derived from the solution to the rms problem. Crucially it depends on the elasticity
of substitution ".
The estimation ofWij amounts to the two-stage estimation procedure. Assuming normal distri-
bution of the error term in the log-linear gravity model (A14), HMR estimate a Probit specication
(A18). The residuals from this estimation are the predicted probabilities of the rm-level export
selection. Using these probabilities HMR backs out the fraction of exporters by calculating the
inverse CDF of the assumed normal distribution (). The consistent estimate for Wij (A19) de-
pends on   (k   "+ 1)=("  1) where  needs to be estimated. The nal consistent estimating
equation (A20) that controls for heterogeneity bias (through fraction of rms that choose to export)
and selection bias (calculated using Mills ratio) is:
mij = 0 + j + i   dij|{z}
Intensive Margin
+ lnfexp[(bzij + bij)]  1g| {z }
Extensive Margin
+ ubij| {z }
Non-Random Selection
+ eij ; (2)
where  the elasticity of the variable trade barrier with a respect to trade volume mij between
the exporter j and importer i;  is non-linear parameter that measures the combined e¤ect of the
rm-level heterogeneity and non-random sample selection on trade volumes; u is a parameter
controlling for non-random export selection and j , i are the exporter, importer xed e¤ects
respectively.
The inference presented by HMR is based on the estimating equation (3) and merits detailed
discussion. First, this equation controls for all discussed inconsistencies in estimating . Second,
the extensive margin is controlled by the non-linear term (lnfexp[(bzij + bij)]   1g) and requires
the whole model to be estimated by the MLE. This measure is a linear combination of the selection
e¤ect bij and fraction of existing exporters bzij . It is worth emphasizing that dij in the equation (2)
also a¤ects the estimate of . From the Figure A it is apparent that the lower variable trade barrier
increases the productivity cuto¤ 1 "ij, meaning that for a given xed export costs more rms are
starting to export. The statistical signicance, sign and magnitude of the extensive margin depends
on the elasticity of substitution " through the expression of . If the elasticity of substitution "
is high, than  will be small. In the extreme case if " ! 1 )  ! 0 and therefore the extensive
margin will not be important in explaining the trade volumes. Moreover, for some values of ", the
estimate of  may be statistically non-zero, but small enough so that it becomes negative.
If b is signicant, omitting the measure of the extensive margin bias the estimate of  upwards
(in the negative sense), since  should have positive e¤ect on export volumes, while correlation
between the fraction of exporters and the variable trade barriers should be negative. Third, u
captures non-random nature of zeros in the trade matrix. If this measure is omitted there should
be a downward bias in the estimate of  since the export countries with large observed trade costs
are likely to have low unobserved trade costs. Also this measure does not depend on the elasticity
of substitution " and should be statistically signicant in the estimation provided there is enough
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zero-trade relationships to indentify the selection equation (A18) in the rst stage.
2.3 An Empirical Modication
The key result of the HMR model is showing that the omission of the extensive margin (hetero-
geneity bias) is most signicant source of inconsistency in estimating  in the gravity model (2)
relative to controlling for the selection bias. However, since the estimator of the extensive marginb depends on elasticity of substitution ", the extent of the robustness of the HMR nding may be
questionable if export composition of the trading partners is considered.
To account for di¤erences in the export composition between the trading partners, I divide the
set of all countries into two regions: the relatively skill-intensive North and the relatively labor-
intensive South. On average, I expect the Northern countries to export di¤erentiated varieties
(manufactured products), while Southern countries to export homogeneous goods (agricultural and
mineral products)4. Thus, once the regional e¤ects are considered, the importance of the extensive
margin becomes very sensitive to the value of elasticity of substitution "5. In the regions where
elasticity of substitution is low, the extensive margin should dominate the selection e¤ect, while the
opposite should emerge for the regions where elasticity of substitution is high. This reasoning is in
line with Chaney (2008), who nds that higher elasticity of substitution magnies the sensitivity
of the intensive margin to changes in trade barriers, whereas it dampens the sensitivity of the
extensive margin.
To test the robustness of the extensive margin, I modify the gravity specication (A14) to
control for the regional response of trade barriers on trade ows through a rened measure of
the intensive margin. This additional measure of the intensive margin can be introduced through
region interaction terms in to the estimating gravity equation (A14). Let rj denote the indicator
variable that is equal to one if the exporter j is a country from a region r and is zero otherwise.
The estimating gravity equation then becomes:
mij = 0 + j + i   1dij + rjdij + wij + uij ; (3)
where 1 captures the main impact of the trade barriers on the trade volumes, while  (to be
estimated) now captures an additional impact of the trade-barriers given a particular exporter
region.
The sign of b in (3) depends on the exact region assignment for the interaction variable rj . If
rj = 1 when an exporter is from the skill-intensive region, I expect a positive estimated coe¢ cient
for . In this case, if the more skill-intensive technology lowers the marginal cost of production it
will mitigate the negative impact of the trade-barriers on the rm-level exports. The opposite sign
for  should be expected if the rm is an exporter operates at a high marginal cost. Hence, the
4With the country-level data this is only a hypothesis.
5From the import demand elasticities reported by Broda and Weinsten (2006) I infer for example, that median
elasticity of substitution in the food and vegetable sectors is 20 percent, while in various manufacturing sectors is 8
percent.
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region interaction term proxies for the unobservable e¤ect of technology di¤erences among rms
at the country-level once the rm-level heterogeneity has been partialed out. An omission of this
proxy results in the biased estimation of wij . Since the estimate of wij depends on the elasticity
of substitution ", which in turn depends on the export composition of varieties, there is a non-zero
correlation between the fraction of rms that choose to export and the regional response of change
in the trade volumes to the change in the variable trade barrier. The direction of this bias depends
on the choice of rj . When the skill-intensive region is picked, b from bwij will be overestimated6.
My estimation results conrm the signicance of the region interaction term with an expected sign.
3 Data
In my empirical analysis, I examine unidirectional bilateral exports for 158 countries that are split
into the two regions: North and South over the 1972-1997 periods. The Northern countries are taken
to be the OECD countries. Out of 158 countries in my sample there are 29 OECD countries. This
leaves me with 129 developing/emerging (Southern) countries. The empirical framework discussed
thus far only allows for cross-section analysis. To compare my results with the HMR, I estimate
all the specications for 1986. Hence for these specications I drop ve countries from the OECD
sub-set since they were not part of the OECD block in 1986. In the additional robustness checks
I estimate all the specications for 1972 and 1996 modifying the OECD country set accordingly.
The list of the OECD countries along with the accession dates is provided in the Table A1. The
list of all the developing countries is provided in the Table A2.
The extended HMR model allows me to evaluate the impact of variable and xed trade bar-
riers on the export volumes at the country level controlling for the region of the exporter origin
through the interaction of the trade barrier measures with the region indicator variable. The trade
data comes from Feenstras World Trade Flows, 1970-1992 and World Trade Flows, 1980-1997
constructed by the HMR. I use the same set of trade barriers as HMR. These trade barriers are
constructed from the country level-data and come from the three sources: the Penn World Ta-
bles, the World Banks World Development Indicators and the CIAS World Factbook. Hence, my
specication estimates can be straightforwardly compared to the results obtained by the HMR.
To gain an insight into importance of elasticity of substitution in the two-stage consistent
estimating equation, I use the data on the import demand elasticities available from Broda and
Weinstein (2006). This data set contains elasticities of imported products according to the six digit
HS classication for 73 countries from 1994-2003. I calculate the mean of the import elasticities
based on the product HS-code and use the median elasticity from each product group as a proxy
for the elasticities of substitution.
The list of all the variables along with their description is provided in the Appendix B.
6 If the regional response proxy is omitted e = b+ bcorr(rjdij ; wij). When an exporter is from the technologically
advanced region (rj = 1), b > 0; corr(rjdij ; wij) > 0. Hence, the bias term is positive.
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Preliminary Data Analysis
The expression for the trade volumes given the region of origin (3) suggests di¤erences in number
of trading partners regardless of the destination markets. In particular, for the skill-intensive
North these di¤erences quantitatively imply signicantly fewer zeros in the trade matrix relative to
the Southern exporters. To highlight the asymmetries in trade ows between the North (OECD)
countries and the South (developing countries), I plot the distribution of country pairs based on
the direction of trade. Figure 1 plots the fraction of country-pairs that engage in the trade in
both directions (country j exports to country i and vice versa), in the one-way trade (only one of
the trade partners exports) and in no trade (both trade partners do not export) for all the years
in the sample given that exporter is one of the OECD countries. In Figure 2 the exporter is a
developing country. Both gures7 reveal an additional dimension in looking at the trade ow data:
when considering the bilateral trade ows from the OECD countries, the fraction of the country
pairs engaging in the two-way trade tremendously dominates that for the developing countries.
Comparing these two gures to the original HMR calculation, where every country is symmetric,
it appears that decomposition into developed and developing countries is fully subsumed in the
World-World exports. Thus, when all the countries are treated symmetrically, the average e¤ect of
trade barriers on the trade volumes is obtained. It is overestimated for the developing countries,
and it is underestimated for the developed countries.
In the regression analysis, I capture the di¤erences among exporters by di¤erences in responses
of trade volumes to trade barriers given the exporter region of origin. Moreover, the extensive
margin implicitly depends on e¤ects of xed trade barriers on the trade volumes. The preliminary
signicance of these interaction terms can be analyzed with xed barrier mean-di¤erence tests. The
signicant di¤erences in the means between xed trade barriers in the North and the South imply
non-symmetric responses of these trade barriers on the exporter once the region of the exporter
origin is accounted for. Table I provides the results of the mean-di¤erence tests for all the xed
trade barriers that will be used in the main estimation. As most of these barriers are binary
indicators, the means of these variables represent the fraction of exporters that face these barriers
in the specic region. Consider, for example, the mean-di¤erence test for the Language. This
indicator variable takes the value of one if both the exporter j and the importer i speak same
language. Thus, the exporters from the North have an average of twenty percent of the world
trading partners who speak same language, while this fraction is around thirty percent for the
exporters from the South. The di¤erence in means for this trade barrier is signicant at any level.
Given that sharing same language should have a positive impact on trade volumes for the j   i
country pair, this test suggests that response of the trade volumes to the language trade barrier
should be signicantly di¤erent for the Northern exporter compared to the Southern exporter. The
similar analysis applies to all other barriers. Across most of these barriers, I observe signicant
di¤erences between the xed trade barriers that an average exporter from a particular region faces.
7The distribution of direction of trade between OECD-OECD and Developing-Developing countries shows similar
patterns.
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4 Estimation Results
4.1 Traditional Gravity Empirics with the Region Controls
I begin by estimating the traditional gravity model to conrm theoretical predictions of the re-
spective controls in the gravity regression. Importantly, I test whether the impact of the trade
barriers on the trade volumes is lower for the Northern exporters as compared to the Southern. For
example, the further apart the two country pairs are, the smaller the volume of trade, but less so
if the exporter is a rm from the North. The extended empirical model (3) can be estimated with
the following cross-sectional specication:
mij = 0 + j + i   1dij   2ij + 1dij North+ 2ij North+ uij ; (4)
where mij is the log of the import volume of the trading partner i from the partner j; dij is a log
of the variable trade barrier; ij is a vector of xed trade barriers; North is an indicator variable
that is equal to 1 if an exporter is from the developed country (OECD) and is zero otherwise, and
j ; i are the exporter and the importer xed e¤ects respectively. The coe¢ cients on the interaction
terms capture the di¤erences in the export behavior between the rms in the both regions. The
traditional gravity model uses data on the country pairs that trade at least in the one direction.
As HMR, I take an alternative specication, by using the data on the unidirectional trade instead
of constructing the symmetric trade ows for imports and exports for each country pair, but at
the same time introduce the exporter and the importer xed e¤ects. The xed e¤ects capture
underlying di¤erences between trading partners that do not change in the given time period. This
approach allows me to represent each country pair twice: once for exports from i to j and once for
exports from j to i:
The results of the benchmark gravity estimation (4) for 1986 are reported in the column three
of the Table II. There are only 11,146 non-censored observations out of 24,649 for the entire cross-
section, reecting no trade between many country pairs. All of the standard errors are clustered
by country pairs to account for a bilateral trading partner relationship. For ease of comparison,
the original HMR estimation results are shown in the rst column. Even though the signs of
the estimates are mostly the same in both specications, the magnitudes di¤er substantially. As
expected, the country j exports more to country i when they are closer to each other, speak the
same language, are the members of the free trade agreements, share colonial ties, have the same
legal system and share the same border, neither trading partner is an island nor land locked, and
both share the same currency union. Interestingly, the sign on the common religion di¤ers for both
specications, but in both it is not signicant.
Controlling for di¤erences in regional responses through interaction terms agree with my initial
predictions. Consider the estimate of distance together with its interaction term: this suggests
that when the country is a Northern exporter, the magnitude of the negative e¤ect of distance
on trading volume is reduced to 0:98 ( 1:255 + 0:279). These estimates suggest that even before
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controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among the rms, the coe¢ cient on distance has declined
by 1:3 times when interacted with the region indicator variable and this e¤ect is highly signicant.
That is, the e¤ect of distance on export volume for any exporter from developed country is 1:3
times smaller than the same e¤ect for a developing country. Similar di¤erences in magnitudes are
obtained for other trade barriers. Thus, even through the benchmark traditional gravity estimation,
it is apparent that the HMR model overestimates the e¤ect of trade barriers on the trade volumes
for the exporters in the developed countries, and it underestimates the same e¤ect for the exporters
in the developing countries. While this paper documents only the empirical di¤erences in region
asymmetries using symmetric HMR model, the reason for these di¤erences may stem from the
export composition in the both regions.
In addition to the basic gravity estimates, columns (2) and (4) in Table II report the marginal
e¤ects of estimating the export selection Probit model (A18) that I extend by adding region-barrier
interaction terms similar to the model (4). These marginal e¤ects are evaluated at the sample
means and can be directly interpreted as probabilities of the rm selection into export market with
di¤erential e¤ects of region-barrier indicator controls. While the Probit estimates are used in the
two-stage consistent estimating method, they are reported here to verify that the trade barriers
that a¤ect the export volumes also a¤ect the probabilities that exporter j exports to i in the same
way. The reported probability estimates readily conrm this conjecture. Importantly, similar to
the benchmark gravity estimation, controlling for the region of the exporter origin mitigates the
negative e¤ect of trade barriers on the probability of the rm export selection for the Northern rms
as compared to the Southern rms. The notable exceptions are the border and the religion barriers.
As in the original HMR estimation a common border raises the volume of trade but reduces the
probability of trading. The opposite result appears for the religion: common religion reduces the
export volumes, but less so for the Northern exporter while increases the probability of trading,
but less so for the Northern exporter. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is highly
signicant in export volumes estimation and not signicant at any level in the Probit estimation.
Hence, it appears that the common religion strongly a¤ects the formation of trading relationships
when the exporter is a Southern country and not important when exporter is a Northern country.
The HMR estimate of the religion barrier is an average e¤ect for the World-World export selection8.
For some trade barriers (colonial ties, common border, currency union and free trade agreement)
the region interaction e¤ects can be estimated for the export volume specication but not for the
export selection. The separate selection e¤ects of these trade barriers cannot be identied for the
Northern exporters as very few of them share colonial ties, many share the common border and are
the members of a currency union or a free trade agreement with their trading partners9. Similar
to the HMR nding, the export selection equation extended with region-barrier interaction terms
8The HMR estimate for the common religion is 10 percent, while my estimate is 11 percent when exporter is a
Southern country and (11-0.05) 10.95 percent when exporter is a Northern country, but this e¤ect is not signicant.
9The average fraction of the Northern exporters who share colonial ties with their trading partner is 3 percent ;
common border is 1 percent; members of a currency union is 0.2 percent and members of a free trade agreement is
1.7 percent (See Table I)
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appears to be important in correcting the selection bias in the traditional gravity model.
4.2 Extended Two-Stage Gravity Estimation
I now turn to the empirical specication and the results of the extended consistent estimation
of the gravity model (3) using two-stage procedure that was outlined in the Section 2.2. This
procedure amounts to estimating the Probit selection equation (A18). The residuals obtained from
this estimation are then used to derive the controls10 for the extensive margin (bwij) and the non-
random selection (bij)11 in the gravity specication (2). Also in the Section 2.3, I set up an empirical
extension of the model (A14) to include region-barrier interaction controls. Such extension results
in the model (3). Combining specication (2) with (3) and using the log-linear denition of the
xed export costs (xed trade barriers) (A16), I obtain the extended consistent specication for
the gravity model (4):
mij = 0+j+i 1dij 2ij+1dijNorth+2ijNorth+lnfexp[(bzij+bij)] 1g+ubij+eij ;
(5)
where all the parameters were dened previously. Since this model in non-linear in , I estimate it
using Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE).
To avoid the reliance on the normality assumption of the unobserved trade cost, estimating
the second stage model (5) requires an exclusion restriction. This restriction should be selected
such that it provides the measure of the xed trade costs that a¤ect the probability of the export
selection, but not the export volumes. In the previous studies that have used this two-stage method,
few di¤erent variables were suggested to satisfy this restriction requirement. For example, in the
original HMR paper, the authors use regulation costs and the common religion, while Manova
(2006) uses an island as an excluded variable. I follow the HMR and use common religion as an
excluded variable. In the original HMR estimation this variable signicantly a¤ects the probability
of the export selection, but it is not important once such decision has been made (this variable is
not correlated with second-stage estimated residuals). This means that religion is only a xed cost
hurdle that an exporter faces. Once the exporter overcomes this cost, it does not a¤ect the export
volumes through its relation with per-unit variable trade cost. When I introduce the region-barrier
interaction terms, the justication of the common religion as a valid exclusion restriction becomes
less obvious. While the coe¢ cient on the common religion is signicant in the Probit estimation, the
region-religion interaction term is not signicant implying that for the Northern exporter religion
does not a¤ect the probability of selection. Nonetheless, one can strongly reject the null hypothesis
10The detailed steps on how to derive these estimators are provided in the Appendix A3.2.
11Similar to HMR (2008) and Manova (2006) the rst-stage Probit estimation results in the small number of
exporter-importer pairs whose probability of trade bij is indistinguishable from 1 or 0. In this case it is not possible
to infer any di¤erences in the latent variable that controls for the extensive margin - bzij . I assign bij = 0:9999999
for the country pairs where bij = 1 and bij = 0:0000001 for the country pairs where bij cannot be estimated or it is
very close to zero. This transformation eliminates 3.1 percent of the non-censored country-pairs (out of 11,146).
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of the joint signicance for this variable pair. Hence, overall the common religion appears to be
an important xed cost variable that a¤ects export selection. In addition, I test whether common
religion is correlated with the residuals from the second stage estimation. I nd that, while there
is no correlation between the residuals and common religion, there is correlation of 0:18 between
the residuals and the region-religion interaction term. Hence, the evidence for the validity of the
religion as an exclusion restriction appears to be mixed. However, the overall e¤ect of this variable
seems to pass both requirements.
The results of estimating the model (5) are reported in the Table III. Columns (1) and (2) are
the HMR estimates of the benchmark and the corrected gravity models without region of origin
controls respectively. I re-estimate the original HMR model (A20) using Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (MLE) instead of Non-Linear Least Squares. This approach provides more e¢ cient
estimation and as evident from the column (2) gives almost identical estimates to the ones found
by HMR. The coe¢ cient on distance drops by almost a third, while the magnitude of the other
xed barriers are either reduced by the order of the magnitude or become insignicant. Moreover,
the controls for the extensive margin bwij and the non-random selection bij are signicant with the
former by almost one and half times larger in the magnitude then the latter. The key implication of
this estimation is the importance of the extensive margin (heterogeneity bias) over the non-random
selection.
Next, I consider estimates of the gravity model where the region of the exporter origin is
controlled for. Column (4) in the Table III reports these estimates. It is immediately evident that
these estimates continue to support my argument: the negative/positive e¤ect of the trade barriers
on the export volumes is mitigated for the Northern (OECD) exporters, and is magnied for the
Southern exporters. Importantly, the magnitude of the overall e¤ects of the trade barriers, while
still overestimated in the benchmark estimation with region controls (column (3)), does not drop by
as much as reported by the HMR. For example the coe¢ cient on distance using two-stage method
is 1:2 times smaller then the distance coe¢ cient in the benchmark estimation. In the original HMR
estimation this coe¢ cient is 1:4 times smaller (see columns (1) and (2)). This di¤erence is picked
by the region-barrier interaction term. Thus, when all countries treated as symmetric partners
the extensive margin seems to play the key role in explaining the bias in estimating the trading
volumes, but the magnitudes of the e¤ects of the trade barriers are roughly the averages of the
same estimates when Northern and Southern exporters are considered separately. Crucially, the
relative importance of the rm-level heterogeneity and non-random export selection appears to be
reversed. While, they are still both positive, it is now the selection measure bij , that by is almost
one and half times larger in the magnitude then the measure of the extensive margin bwij .
Recall that originally, HMR claim that the omission of the extensive margin from the gravity
model results in overestimation of the elasticity of the trade barriers with a respect to trade volumes
- coe¢ cients 1 and 2 in (5), but ommitting the export-selection correction ubij results in
underestimation of these elasticities. However, with a more rened data analysis, while it appears
that these elasticities are overestimated, the role of the extensive margin in explaining this fact
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is questionable. To gain some initial insight into the importance of the extensive margin when
regional di¤erences are accounted for, I decompose the biases into separate estimating equations.
The results of this decomposition are provided in the Table IV. In the rst two columns of the Table
IV, I report the benchmark and MLE estimates of the extended consistent gravity model that I
have estimated previously (see Table III). The last two columns give the estimates when I just
control for rm-level heterogeneity (column (3)) and non-random export selection (column(4)). To
estimate the latter, I apply simple linear correction bzij =  1(bij). This model can be estimated
using OLS, as there is no non-linearity in the extensive margin estimator. To estimate the former,
I use the two-step consistent Heckman sample selection model. In this case bij is the reported Mills
Ratio. In both models, I continue to control for regional e¤ects through region-barrier interaction
terms.
It is evident from this decomposition that rm-level heterogeneity appears to explain almost
all the biases in the standard gravity equation even when I control for regional di¤erences among
the exporters. This result is in-line with the original HMR ndings. However, the estimate of
the countries pairing into exporter-importer relationship bij is slightly larger than the estimate of
the unobserved rm-level heterogeneity bzij . Hence, it appears that, while within country variation
in the fraction of exporters explains the biases in the standard gravity model, the non-random
selection is equally as important. I now further split the data to determine the signicance of
the extensive margin based on the theoretical prediction: the extensive margin should be most
important in explaining biases in the gravity model when the exporter in an OECD country.
4.3 Bias Decomposition Based on the Exporter-Importer Region of Origin
The main estimation discussed in the previous section has led to the following conjecture: the
extensive margin is important in explaining the biases in the standard gravity model, but it is
region dependent. That is, when I control for region of the exporter origin the magnitude of the
impact of the extensive margin on export volumes is reduced substantially compared to the simple
World-World trade estimation.
To further explore the signicance of the extensive margin, I drop the region-barrier interaction
terms and estimate the original HMR model (A20) on the sub-set of countries based on exporter-
importer trading region. In my data set, I have the exporter and importer country code. This
allows me to construct four exporter-importer trading zones: North-North, North-South, South-
North and South-South. The denition for the Northern countries and Southern countries remains
the same. I estimate the model (A20) using Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE), use religion
as an excluded variable throughout all the specications and perform bias decomposition. The sta-
tistical signicance and relative magnitude of bzij to bij will indicate how important is the extensive
margin relative to the selection into exporter-importer relationship. When the Northern country
is an exporter, I expect the extensive margin to dominate. The exports from these countries are
primarily di¤erentiated manufactured goods and services. As the elasticity of substitution " for
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these varieties is low, I expect the estimate of the extensive margin  to be large and signicant.
Conversely, when the exporter is a Southern country, the export composition should consist primar-
ily of the homogeneous agricultural and/or natural resource products. In this case, the elasticity of
substitution " should be high making b small and insignicant. Thus, the elasticity estimates of the
trade barriers with a respect to the trade ows in the gravity model, where the OECD (Northern)
country is an exporter, must be biased upwards if the extensive margin correction is ommitted.
Conversely, when the Non-OECD (Southern) country is an exporter these estimated should be
biased downwards if the measure of the non-random export selection measure bij . is ommitted.
In the cross-regional trade, I expect some mixed results, but similarly in the North-South trade
an extensive margin should prevail over the export-selection so that ommitting both corrections
should result in the upwards bias in the elasticity estimates.
The estimates of these bias decompositions are provided in Tables V (A-D) for each trade
zone combination respectively. In each of the tables I report the number of censored observations
along with total number of underlying observations. When the number of censored and total
observations is nearly the same, it is impossible to identify the selection equation. As a result, the
relative importance of the extensive margin to the non-random selection cannot be determined. I
encounter such situation when the North-North trading relations are being considered (Table V
(A)). Since the number of censored observations is six, both bzij and bij are insignicant as partial
e¤ects of these variables cannot be determined. Thus, even though I expect the extensive margin
to be most signicant in this trading relationship, I cannot convincingly conclude so.
First, I nd that while b is insignicant in each second-stage trading region estimations, the
sample selection correction bij is always signicant except for North-North estimation for the rea-
sons discussed earlier. Since the measure of the extensive margin is a non-linear combination of
imputed probabilities of export selection and non-random sample selection correction, it appears
that the signicance of the extensive margin in the HMR estimation is driven by non-random sam-
ple selection rather than rm-level heterogeneity. Second, the puzzling outcome occurs with the
North-South trading relation. While the number of censored observations is fairly high to identify
the selection equation, the estimate of the extensive margin is not signicant in the simple linear
correction model (bzij). That is at the country level rm-level heterogeneity plays no role in explain-
ing trade ows from the Northern exporters. The estimates of bzij and bij for the South-North and
the South-South trading relations are in-line with my initial analysis. In the bias decomposition
for the South-North, the extensive margin estimate is signicant, but has a negative sign. This can
be explained by high elasticity of substitution for the exported varieties. For the South-South, the
extensive margin is not signicant, while non-random selection e¤ect dominates. Interestingly, the
coe¢ ent on distance in the benchmark model (without export-selection correction) is smaller, than
the same estimate when this correction is applied12. Thus, as early predicted, when the export-
selection plays most important role in explaining the trade ows, omission of this correction leads to
downward bias in the bencmark model. More generally, these ndings highlight that the extensive
12 In Table V(D) these estimates are -1.214 and -1.414 respectively
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margin of trade that corrects for the rm-level heterogeneity is only signicant and important only
for the aggregate trade-ows. Once the trading relations are more rened, the e¤ect of extensive
margin on the trade ows disappears.
The table below summarizes these ndings:
Extensive Margin vs. Non-Random Export Selection
Region-Pair Extensive Margin Export Selection Data Support?
N-N X  Inconclusive
N-S X X No
S-N X X Partial
S-S  X Yes
In this table the second and the third columns identify the relative importance of the extensive
margin to the non-random export selection that should hold in theory. For example, the check mark
and the dash for North-North trading relation means that the extensive margin should explain all
the biases in the standard gravity model, while export selection should not play a role. For the
South-South trading relation the importance of these controls is reversed. In the cross-region trade
both extensive margin and export selection should play some role with extensive margin slightly
dominating in the North-South trade. The last column indicates if these relationships hold in the
data. For the North-South trade (Table V(B)), while coe¢ ecient on distance seems to be slightly
overestimated in the benchmark model as compared to the two-stage model estimates, it appears
that extensive margin correction cannot explain this upward bias as it is not signicant in any of
the specications, which as I mentioned earlier is a puzzling result.
4.4 Robustness of the Extensive Margin over Time
One of the main deciencies of the Melitz framework is inability to endogenize the technology
accumulation over time. Thus, it is not possible to estimate a structural gravity model on the
panel with many countries over some span of years. While the main set of results obtained in this
paper came from estimating the cross-sectional regressions for 1986, the question arises how the
importance of extensive margin changes over time.
To address this question, I estimate the main extended model (5) for 1972 and 199613. The
results of these estimations are provided in the Table IV. The magnitudes and signs of the respective
coe¢ cients on the trade barriers and region-barrier interaction terms remain nearly the same as
for original estimation for 1986. Similar to the 1986 cross-section, for the Northern exporter the
negative impact of the trade barriers on trade volumes is mitigated, while the positive impact is
amplied. Thus, the e¤ects of trade barriers on trading volumes seem to be robust over time.
131972 is the year when the data sample begins. While, I have the data through 1997, this year coincide with Asian
nancial crisis. To avoid any perverse results that can be associated with this year, I select 1996.
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The key interest lies in the estimates of the extensive margin b and the non-random selectionbij . If the technological accumulation matters, than over time the relative importance of the exten-
sive margin and export selection should reverse their roles. As more developing countries acquire
new skills through increasing demand for education or spillovers from multinationals, the rms
in these countries considerably reduce their unit-costs and are able to export mode di¤erentiated
varieties. Thus, over time the composition of exports in the developing countries should begin to
resemble that for the developed countries where rm-level heterogeneity seems to play the key role
in explaining the biases in the standard gravity model of trade. The results reported in the Table
IV strongly support this analysis. Interestingly, not only the roles of rm-level heterogeneity and
export selection have reversed from 1972 to 1996, their magnitudes have changed roughly by the
order of two. That is when I estimate the standard gravity model for 1972, I nd that the failure to
control for export selection biases the estimates of the trade barriers in the standard gravity model
with much smaller e¤ect of the extensive margin. For the 1996 estimation the opposite outcome
holds. From the bias decomposition analysis for 1986, the relative importance of the extensive
margin to the export selection lies somewhere in between.
With the fall of the unit-costs over time, the probability of the export selection in the developing
countries should rise as more exporters would be able to overcome xed export costs. To check if
this holds true, I select France and Paraguay as two representative countries from the North and the
South respectively according to their median distance to all other trading partners. The average
probabilities of export selection for 1972 and 1996 can be inferred from the residuals obtained by
estimating the Probit specication (A18) for each of the cross-sections. I nd that for the Paraguay
the average probability of the export selection was 0:29 in 1972 and 0:38 in 1996. Even though
the increase is not very considerable it reects the export trends in Paraguay14. Finally, I plot the
residual probabilities of export selection for France and Paraguay against the export volumes for
1972, 1986 and 1996. The respective Figures 3 (a-c) show that, while for France the probability
of export selection is close to 1 for all the years, these probabilities seems to converge to France
especially for 1996. This result further conrms the change in the importance of the extensive
margin which is associated with a change in the export composition over time.
5 Conclusion
This paper builds on the HMR model to determine how robust the importance of the extensive
margin (number of exporting rms) in explaining the biases in the standard gravity model. I apply
the HMR methodology on the more rened world-trade data set, where I split the data by the
regions of the exporter origins. The motivation for doing this is to check if the predictions of the
HMR model continue to hold for the trade ows that theoretically must favor the extensive margin
correction over the export-selection in explaining the trade ows.
14According to the World Bank report (2007) for example, in 1986 Paraguay exported $519 million worth of the
manufactured goods, while in 2006 this gure was $1,500 millions - an almost 2 percent increase.
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My estimation results conrm that elasticity estimates in the benchmark gravity model are
overestimated regardless of the data split as shown by HMR. However, unlike HMR I nd that the
extensive margin correction cannot fully explain this upward bias when the trade between OECD
and non-OECD countries is considered. One of the explanation for this nding is the e¤ect of the
elasticity of substitution in determining the signcance of the extensive margin. For the countries
that primarily export di¤erentiated products, ommitting the extensive margin correction results in
the upwards bias in the elasticity of trade barriers with a respect to trade volumes (the intensive
margin), while for the countries that export homogeneous products, the intensive margin estimates
are biased downwards when not corrected for the rm selection. I partially conrm these predictions
by the bias decomposition in the estimation of the gravity model given the trade-relation regions.
Importantly, contrary to the theoretical predictions, I nd it puzzling that extensive margin is
insignicant for the North-South trade.
The cross-section estimations of the extended gravity model reveal the change in the magnitude
of the extensive margin relative the export selection. This measure was four times larger in the
estimation for 1996 compared to 1972. Such signicant increase can be attributed to the change
in the export composition over time. Perhaps, through the technology accumulation over time the
developing countries are switching from exporting homogeneous goods to di¤erentiated products so
that their export patterns resemble the developed countries. However, a separate study is required
to explore this linkage. The present framework fails to capture this time dimension, as it requires
endogenizing the growth in technology accumulation over time.
The HMR framework appears to be elegant in the implementation. It provides a bridge between
the "new trade" theory and econometric estimations. With a relatively simple extension, I was able
to obtain additional important insights that challenge the conclusions of the HMR model. A more
detailed indutsry-level study is needed, however to fully explore what indenties the extensive
margin in the trade ows.
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A The HMR Model
Note: Most of the contents in the Appendix A is taken from the original paper by Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein. It is reported here for the reference purpose only.
A.1 Set Up
The theoretical part of the HMRmodel is slightly modied and simplied version of the Melitz(2003)
model. Consider a world with J countries, that are indexed by j = 1; 2:::; J and unpartioned by any
region. There is a set of varieties l available for a consumption in every country j that is denoted
by Bj. The demand for each variety is derived from the CES utility function that is common to the
every country j:
Uj =
"Z
l2Bj
qj(l)
dl
#1=
; 0 <  < 1; (A1)
where qj(l) is its consumption of the product l and the parameter  determines the elasticity of
substitution across products. This constant elasticity can be dened as " = 11  and it is the same
in every country. Given the parameter restrictions on , " > 1.
Let Yj be the income of the country j, which is equal to some expenditure level such that
Uj  Yj . This notation gives the following budget constraint:
Yj =
Z
l2Bj
pj(l)qj(l)dl; (A2)
where pj(l) is the price of product l in any country j. Maximizing (A1) subject to (A2), the demand
for the product l in any country j is
qj(l) =
pj(l)
 "Yj
P 1 "j
with Pj =
"Z
l2Bj
pj(l)
1 "dl
#1=(1 ")
; (A3)
where pj(l), Yj ; " (constant elasticity of substitution) are dened as above and Pj is the countrys
j an ideal price index.
A.2 Production and Trade Volumes
As in standard Melitz(2003) model, in any country j there is a continuum of rms of measure Nj
each producing a di¤erentiated variety l in a monopolistically competitive environment. Addition-
ally, the varieties produced by the rms in country j are distinct from the varieties produced by
the rms in country i, for i 6= j. Hence there are PJj=1Nj products in the world economy.
To participate in the domestic and the export production rms in any country j bear variable
and xed costs. The variable cost is assumed to be a production cost which is a combination of the
country specic cost cj and per-unit rm-specic marginal cost a. The inverse of this marginal cost
(1=a) represents the rm productivity level that is di¤erent across rms in the same country. Thus,
the rm with the lowest marginal cost a is the most productive. Given this notation, each rm in
country j is producing a variety l using cost-minimizing combination of inputs cja. To determine
how productive a rm j is, there is a cumulative distribution function of the marginal costs G(a)
with the support aH > aL > 0. This distribution is common to all countries.
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When producing for the domestic market, the HMR model assumes that any rm j bears only
variable production cost cja and no xed costs. Denote any xed cost as fij , where i is any foreign
country and j is any domestic country. The assumption of zero xed costs to produce for the
domestic market means that fjj = 0: If a rm in the country j decides to enter the export market,
it bears non-zero xed cost fij > 0 and per-unit variable ice-bergtype transport cost15  ij > 1,
such that  ij units of any variety l must be shipped from a country j for one unit of this variety to
arrive to a country i:
With the monopolistic competition, the rms choose price pj(l) of a variety l to maximize
prots, taking demand (A3) as given. Thus, any rm j solves the following problem:
max
pj(l)
 = pj(l)qj(l)  cja ijqj(a)  fij . (A4)
The solution to the problem (A4) yields the following expression for the delivery price of variety l
from exporter j to importer i:
pj(l) =  ij
cja

: (A5)
This is a standard mark-up pricing equation, with the mark-up 1= diminishing in the elasticity of
demand , adjusted for per-unit transportation cost  ij . Substitution of (A5) and (A3) into (A4)
yields the operating prots from sales into a country i that are associated with this price level:
ij(l) = (1  )

 ijcja
Pi

Yi   cjfij . (A6)
While the assumption of zero domestic xed costs fjj = 0 implies that every rm will produce in
the domestic market (jj(l) > 0), only a fraction G(aij) of all rms in country j will choose to
export. The export participation cut-o¤ aij can be implicitly found from the zero-prot condition
such that ij(l) = 0. Hence this cut-o¤ denes the minimum level of productivity or alternatively
the maximum marginal cost required for an exporter in a country j to at least break-even:
(1  )

 ijcjaij
Pi

Yi = cjfij . (A7)
The bilateral trade volumes regardless of any region can be expressed as:
Vij =
 R aij
aL
a1 "dG(a) for aij  aL
0 otherwise
. (A8)
Substitution of the pricing rule (A5) and the trade volume expression (A8) into the demand function
(A3) yields an expression for the value of a country is imports from a country j:
Mij =

 ijcj
Pi
1 "
YiNjVij : (A9)
Whenever aij  aL, this trade volume is zero since Vij = 0. Finally, using the denition (A8), (A5)
and (A3), the ideal price index in a country i is:
P 1 "i =
JP
j=1
 ijcj

1 "
NjVij : (A10)
15Since there are no transportation costs to deliver to the domestic market  jj = 1
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Equations (A7)-(A10) provide mapping from the income levels Yi, the number of the rms Ni,
the unit costs ci; the xed costs fij , and the transportation costs  ij to the bilateral trade ows
Mij .
A.3 Empirical Framework
Assume that G(a) follows Pareto-truncated distribution with the following CDF:
G(a) =
(ak   akL)
(akH   akL)
; k > "  1; [aL;aH ]: (A11)
As theoretical implications of the model require, this CDF can capture the case of the zero trade
ows such that aij < aL, (Vij = Mij = 0) as well as an asymmetric trade ows where Mij 6= Mji
for some i  j country pairs. Di¤erentiating (A11) with respect to ak (A8) becomes:
Vij =
kak +1L
(k   + 1)(akH   akL)
Wij ; (A12)
where Wij = max

aij
aL
k +1   1; 0 and aij is determined from the zero-prot condition (A7).
Both Vij and Wij are monotonic functions of the proportion of exporters from j to i.
Log-Linearizing (A9) the estimating gravity model can written as:
mij = (  1) ln  (  1) ln ci + nj + (  1)pi + yi + (  1) ln  ij + vij: (A13)
The variable costs that a¤ect the rm-level exports are captured by the logarithm of ice-bergtype
cost  ij and are the same for any exporter regardless of the region. These costs are stochastic due
to an i.i.d. unmeasured trade frictions uij which are country-pair specic. Letting   1ij  Dijeuij ,
where Dij represents symmetric distance between i and j and uij  N(0; 2u) the estimating gravity
equation (A13) becomes:
mij = 0 + j + i   dij + wij + uij ; (A14)
where j =  (   1) ln cj + nrj is exporter xed e¤ects and i = (   1)pi + yi is importer xed
e¤ects.
A.3.1 Firm Export Selection
Denote the latent variable Zij to be the ratio of the variable export prots of the most productive
rm (with productivity 1aL ) to the xed export costs for exports from j to i:
Zij =
(1  )

Pi

cj ij
" 1
Yia
1 "
L
cjfij
: (A15)
Assume that fij are stochastic xed costs due to unmeasured i.i.d friction vij~N(0; 2v) that may
be correlated with uij and are dened as follows:
fij  exp(EX;j + IM;i + ij   vij); (A16)
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where IM;i is a xed trade barrier imposed by the importing country, EX;j is a measure of xed
export costs common across all export destinations and ij is an observed measure of any additional
country-pair specic xed trade costs16. With this assumption the latent variable Zij in (A15) can
now be expressed as:
zij  ln(Zij) = 0 + j + i   dij   ij + ij; (A17)
where ("  1) ln  ij  dij   uij ; ij  uij + vij~N(0; 2u + 2v) is i.i.d. but correlated with an error
term uij in the gravity model (A14); j =  " ln cij +EX;j , i = ("  1)pi+ yi IM;i are exporter
and importer xed e¤ects respectively. Even though zij is unobserved, it is positive whenever j
exports to i i.e. there is non-zero value of the export volumes in the bilateral trade matrix and it
is zero otherwise:
To obtain the export selection equation, dene the indicator variable Tij = 1 if the country j
exports to country i regardless of the region of the exporter origin and zero otherwise. Let ij be
the probability that the country j exports to the country i conditional on the observed variables.
The export selection equation is the following Probit specication:
ij = Pr(Tij = 1jobserved variables) = (0 + j + i   dij   ij); (A18)
where () is a CDF of the unit-normal distribution, and every starred coe¢ cient represents the
original coe¢ cient divided by :
To obtain the consistent estimate of Wij , let bij be the predicted probability of exports from
j to i that can be obtained from the estimated residuals in the Probit equation (A18). Given the
vector of these predicted probabilities, the estimated fraction of exporting rms can be backed out
by taking an inverse of the unit-normal CDF () - bzij =  1(bij). A consistent estimate for
Wij is:
Wij = maxf(Zij)   1; 0g; (A19)
where   (k   "+ 1)=("  1) and  needs to be estimated.
A.3.2 Consistent Estimation of the Gravity Model
There are two requirements to obtain consistent estimate of  in the gravity specication (A14).
There should be a control variable for endogenous number of exporters (via wij) E[wij j:; Tij = 1]
and a control variable for selection of a country into the trading partner E[uij j:; Tij = 1]. Both of
these terms depend on bij  E[ij j:; Tij = 1_]. Also E[uij j:; Tij = 1] = corr[(uij ; ij); (u )ij ]: Since
ij has a CDF of the unit-normal distribution, a consistent estimate bij can be obtained from the
inverse Mills ratio: bij = (bzij)(bzij) , or estimated from Heckman procedure available from any statistical
package provided a valid exclusion restriction. Finally bzij  bzij + bij is a consistent estimate for
E[zij j:; Tij = 1] and bwij  lnfexp[(bzij+bij)] 1g is a consistent estimate for E[wij j:; Tij = 1] from
(A19). Hence the consistent estimating gravity model is now given by:
mij = 0 + j + i   dij + lnfexp[(bzij + bij)]  1g+ ubij + eij ; (A20)
where u  corr[(uij ; ij); (u )] and eij is i.i.d. distributed error term satisfying E[eij j:; Tij = 1] =
0: Since (A20) is non-linear in , I estimate it using MLE (unlike the HMR who use the NLS).
16See Appendix B for the list of such costs
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B Description of the Main Variables
Note: The data used for this paper is identical to the HMRs paper. Below are the denitions of
all the variables.
Dependent Variables
 trade volume - Unidirectional value of trade volumes between the i  j country pair (in logs).
 trade - a binary variable which is equal to one if trade volume is non-zero,and is zero otherwise.
Explanatory Variables
Variable Trade Barrier
 distance - the symmetric distance between the importers i and the exporters j capitals (in
logs).
Fixed Trade Barriers
 common border - a binary variable which is equal to one if the importer i and the exporter
j share same physical border, and is zero otherwise.
 island - a binary variable which is equal to one if the importer i and the exporter j are both
islands, and is zero otherwise.
 landlocked - a binary variable which is equal to one if the importer i and the exporter j have
both no coastline or direct access to the sea, and zero otherwise.
 colonial ties - a binary variable which is equal to one if the importer i had ever colonized the
exporter j or vice versa, is zero otherwise.
 currency union - a binary variable that is equal to one if the importer i and the exporter j
use same currency or if within the country pair money was interchangeable at 1:1 exchange
rate for an extended period of time (see Rose (2000), Glick and Rose (2002) and Rose (2004)),
and is zero otherwise.
 legal system - a binary variable that is equal to one if the importer i and the exporter j share
the same legal origin, and is zero otherwise.
 religion - (% Protestants in country i  % Protestants in country j) + (% Catholics in country
i  % Catholics in country j) + (% Muslims in country i  % Muslims in country j) .
 FTA - a binary variable that is equal to one if the importer i and the exporter j belong to a
common regional trade agreement, and is zero otherwise.
 language - a binary variable that is equal to to one if the importer i and the exporter j speak
the same language, and is zero otherwise.
Interaction Terms
Both variable and xed trade barrier variables are interacted with a following variable:
 North - a binary variable that is equal to one if the exporter j belongs to a group of the
OECD countries17, and is zero otherwise.
17See Table A1 for the list of these countries
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Table I - The Descriptive E¤ects of the Trade Barriers by Region of Origin
Year=1986 North (total = 4,082) South (total=20,724)
Fixed Barrier Mean Variance Mean Variance t-Test
Language 0.204 0.403 0.302 0.459 (13.843)***
FTA 0.017 0.128 0.004 0.061 (-6.296)***
Colonial 0.030 0.172 0.006 0.075 (-9.057)***
Religion 0.199 0.275 0.227 0.284 (5.774)***
Legal 0.249 0.433 0.393 0.488 (18.986)***
Border 0.015 0.122 0.018 0.132 1.255
Island 0.326 0.469 0.373 0.484 (5.748)***
Land Locked 0.278 0.448 0.269 0.444 -1.104
Currency Union 0.002 0.049 0.011 0.104 (7.992)***
Notes: t-test compares mean di¤erences; unequal pair variance is assumed;
*** signicant at 1%
25
Table II - Benchmark Gravity and Firm Export Selection by Region
Year 1986 (1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT
HMR
mij
Probit-HMR
Tij mij
Probit
Tij
Distance -1.176*** -0.263*** -1.255*** -0.265***
(0.028) (0.0096) (0.034) (0.0095)
Distance * North 0.279*** 0.0616
(0.051) (0.042)
Language 0.176*** 0.113*** 0.131** 0.106***
(0.056) (0.015) (0.066) (0.015)
Language*North 0.205** 0.0995**
(0.095) (0.049)
FTA 0.759*** 0.494*** 0.838*** 0.505***
(0.17) (0.017) (0.17) (0.018)
Colonial 1.299*** 0.128 1.232*** 0.0843
(0.098) (0.094) (0.15) (0.10)
Colonial*North -0.0325
(0.19)
Religion 0.102 0.104*** -0.0147 0.111***
(0.091) (0.023) (0.10) (0.024)
Religion*North 0.329*** -0.0506
(0.12) (0.068)
Legal 0.486*** 0.0384*** 0.456*** 0.0328***
(0.045) (0.012) (0.055) (0.012)
Legal*North 0.163* 0.0885**
(0.084) (0.044)
Border 0.458*** -0.148*** 0.554*** -0.154***
(0.12) (0.036) (0.15) (0.036)
Border*North -0.501*
(0.26)
Island -0.391*** -0.136*** -0.315*** -0.110***
(0.11) (0.029) (0.12) (0.029)
Island*North -0.213** -0.209***
(0.096) (0.036)
Landlocked -0.561*** -0.0717* -0.499*** -0.0547
(0.16) (0.038) (0.17) (0.039)
Landlocked*North -0.168 -0.0722
(0.10) (0.048)
Currency Union 1.364*** 0.190*** 1.258*** 0.200***
(0.25) (0.044) (0.27) (0.045)
Observations 11,146 24,649 11,146 24,463
R2 0.71 0.587 0.71 0.584
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; North =1 if exporer j
is from OECD country; Marginal E¤ects at sample means are reported for Probit;
Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis, Pseudo R2 is reported for Probit
26
Table III - The Consistent Gravity Model Estimation with Region Controls
Year 1986 (1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT
HMR
Benchmark
HMR
MLE Benchmark MLE
Distance -1.176*** -0.807*** -1.255*** -0.992***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.034) (0.038)
Distance * North 0.279*** 0.207***
(0.051) (0.049)
Language 0.176*** 0.0272 0.131** 0.0454
(0.056) (0.055) (0.066) (0.064)
Language*North 0.205** 0.0899
(0.095) (0.092)
FTA 0.759*** 0.394*** 0.838*** 0.577***
(0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14)
Colonial 1.299*** 1.008*** 1.232*** 1.071***
(0.098) (0.095) (0.15) (0.15)
Colonial*North -0.0325 0.648
(0.19) (0.41)
Legal 0.486*** 0.390*** 0.456*** 0.375***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.055) (0.054)
Legal*North 0.163* 0.104
(0.084) (0.081)
Border 0.458*** 0.827*** 0.554*** 0.737***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
Border*North -0.501* 0.333
(0.26) (0.42)
Island -0.391*** -0.175* -0.315*** -0.237**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Island*North -0.213** 0.127
(0.096) (0.095)
Landlocked -0.561*** -0.449*** -0.499*** -0.456***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Landlocked*North -0.168 -0.0526
(0.10) (0.10)
Currency Union 1.364*** 1.030*** 1.258*** 1.071***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27)
 (from bwrij) 0.699*** 0.481***
(0.051) (0.050)brij 0.406*** 0.658***
(0.059) (0.054)
Observations 11,146 11,146 11,146 11,146
R2 0.71 0.71
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South
Religion is excluded variable and not reported; Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis
with country pair clustering *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table IV - Bias Decompositon With Region Controls
Year 1986 (1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Benchmark MLE Firm Heterogeneity Heckman Selection
Distance -1.255*** -0.992*** -1.056*** -1.318***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.043) (0.032)
Distance * North 0.279*** 0.207*** 0.165*** 0.343***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.056)
Language 0.131** 0.0454 0.0378 0.174***
(0.066) (0.064) (0.067) (0.060)
Language*North 0.205** 0.0899 0.176* 0.222**
(0.095) (0.092) (0.095) (0.106)
FTA 0.838*** 0.577*** 0.697*** 0.842***
(0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.161)
Colonial 1.232*** 1.071*** 1.122*** 1.269***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.187)
Colonial*North -0.0325 0.648 2.678*** -0.076
(0.19) (0.41) (0.49) (-0.29)
Legal 0.456*** 0.375*** 0.420*** 0.452***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.049)
Legal*North 0.163* 0.104 0.130 0.188**
(0.084) (0.081) (0.084) (0.092)
Border 0.554*** 0.737*** 0.677*** 0.510***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.132)
Border*North -0.501* 0.333 2.153*** -0.483*
(0.26) (0.42) (0.54) (0.273)
Island -0.315*** -0.237** -0.230* -0.364***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.112)
Island*North -0.213** 0.127 -0.0517 -0.208**
(0.096) (0.095) (0.099) (0.103)
Landlocked -0.499*** -0.456*** -0.458*** -0.519***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.166)
Landlocked*North -0.168 -0.0526 -0.145 -0.133
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.120)
 (from bwrij) 0.481***
(0.050)brij 0.658*** 0.341***
(0.054) (0.059)b_zrij 0.303***
(0.043)
Observations 11,146 (24,806) 11,146 (24,806) 11,146 (24,806) 11,146 (24,806)
R2 0.71 0.71
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South;Currency Union not reported
Religion is excluded variable; Robust standard errors with country pair clustering and total # of
underlying observations are in parenthesis; *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
28
Table V(A) - Bias Decomposition With Exporter-Importer Regions:N-N (Year=1986)
Variables Benchmark MLE Firm Heterogeniety Heckman Selection
Distance -1.083*** -1.086*** -1.086*** -1.086***
(0.074) (0.086) (0.074) (0.074)
Language -0.0151 0.001 0.010 0.010
(0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
FTA -0.104 -0.133 -0.133 -0.133
(0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12)
Colonial 0.517* 0.499 0.499* 0.499*
(0.28) (0.34) (0.28) (0.28)
Religion -0.0831
(0.29)
Legal 0.678*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)
Border 0.0508 0.0394 0.039 0.0394
(0.19) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19)
Island -0.133 -0.130 -0.130 -0.130
(0.43) (0.37) (0.42) (0.42)
Land Locked -1.093*** -1.111*** -1.111*** -1.111***
(0.33) (0.38) (0.34) (0.34)
(from bwrij) 1.218
(9.96)bzrij 0.027
(0.029)brij 1.378 -0.052
(7.89) (0.057)
Observations 643(649) 643(649) 643(649) 643(649)
R2 0.88 0.88
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South;Currency Union not reported
Religion is excluded variable; Robust standard errors with country pair clustering and total # of
underlying observations are in parenthesis; *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
29
Table V(B) - Bias Decomposition With Exporter-Importer Regions:N-S (Year=1986)
Variables Benchmark MLE Firm Heterogeneity Heckman Selection
Distance -1.351*** -1.272*** -1.368*** -1.364***
(0.064) (0.077) (0.065) (0.056)
Language 0.0997 0.0675 0.132 0.128
(0.089) (0.12) (0.089) (0.087)
FTA 1.529*** 0.714 1.471*** 1.513***
(0.45) (0.55) (0.46) (0.370)
Colonial 1.289*** 0.270 1.205*** 1.296***
(0.14) (0.40) (0.28) (0.154)
Religion 0.385**
(0.17)
Legal 0.650*** 0.554*** 0.660*** 0.658
(0.074) (0.094) (0.075) (0.067)
Border 0.423 -0.302 0.400 0.443
(0.35) (0.44) (0.38) (0.285)
Island -0.504*** -0.261 -0.503*** -0.493***
(0.17) (0.23) (0.17) (0.169)
Land Locked -0.560*** -0.459* -0.553*** -0.549***
(0.21) (0.27) (0.21) (0.195)
(from bwrij) 0.0005
(0.0021)bzrij -0.011
(0.029)brij 0.797*** -0.017
(0.073) (0.140)
Observations 2922(3432) 2922(3432) 2922(3432) 2922(3432)
R2 0.79 0.79
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South;Currency Union not reported
Religion is excluded variable; Robust standard errors with country pair clustering and total # of
underlying observations are in parenthesis; *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table V(C) - Bias Decomposition With Exporter-Importer Regions:S-N (Year=1986)
Variables Benchmark MLE Firm Heterogeneity Heckman Selection
Distance -1.351*** -1.108*** -1.239*** -1.238***
(0.064) (0.11) (0.084) (0.076)
Language 0.0997 0.116 0.172 0.187
(0.089) (0.16) (0.12) (0.117)
FTA 1.529*** 0.181 0.802* 1.048**
(0.45) (0.71) (0.44) (0.482)
Colonial 1.289*** -0.200 0.623* 1.054***
(0.14) (0.50) (0.32) (0.199)
Religion 0.385**
(0.17)
Legal 0.650*** 0.668*** 0.792*** 0.790***
(0.074) (0.13) (0.094) (0.091)
Border 0.423 -0.148 0.314 0.579
(0.35) (0.57) (0.38) (0.364)
Island -0.504*** -0.0826 -0.239 -0.222
(0.17) (0.32) (0.23) (0.230)
Land Locked -0.560*** -0.624 -0.648** -0.621**
(0.21) (0.39) (0.32) (0.277)
(from bwrij) 0.052
(0.22)bzrij -0.065*
(0.039)brij 0.787*** 0.273*
(0.10) (0.160)
Observations 2529 (3432) 2529 (3432) 2529 (3432) 2529 (3432)
R2 0.73 0.73
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South;Currency Union not reported
Religion is excluded variable; Robust standard errors with country pair clustering and total # of
underlying observations are in parenthesis; *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table V(D) - Bias Decomposition With Exporter-Importer Regions:S-S (Year=1986)
Variables Benchmark MLE Firm Heterogeneity Heckman Selection
Distance -1.219*** -1.086*** -0.983*** -1.415***
(0.042) (0.19) (0.16) (0.052)
Language 0.301*** 0.273* 0.191* 0.427***
(0.087) (0.14) (0.11) (0.087)
FTA 2.006*** 1.540** 1.427*** 2.431***
(0.31) (0.60) (0.51) (0.309)
Colonial 0.972** 1.306 1.412*** 0.664
(0.38) (1.60) (0.49) (1.128)
Religion -0.0379
(0.14)
Legal 0.246*** 0.201** 0.231*** 0.223***
(0.071) (0.095) (0.071) (0.068)
Border 0.601*** 0.664*** 0.739*** 0.475***
(0.16) (0.25) (0.19) (0.164)
Island -0.216 -0.207 -0.160 -0.234
(0.16) (0.23) (0.17) (0.162)
Land Locked -0.710 -0.651 -0.752* -0.643
(0.44) (0.60) (0.44) (0.420)
(from bwrij) 0.222
(0.42)bzrij 0.331
(0.22)brij 0.781*** 0.730***
(0.29) (0.115)
Observations 5052 (17292) 5062 (17292) 5052 (17292) 5052 (17292)
R2 0.60 0.60
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South;Currency Union not reported
Religion is excluded variable; Robust standard errors with country pair clustering and total # of
underlying observations are in parenthesis; *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table VI - Sensitivity of the Gravity Estimates with Region Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year
COEFFICIENT
1972
Benchmark
1972
MLE
1996
Benchmark
1996
MLE
Distance -1.293*** -1.034*** -1.358*** -1.054***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.031) (0.035)
Distance * North 0.357*** 0.302*** 0.238*** 0.089**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.045) (0.043)
Language 0.278*** 0.150* 0.244*** 0.096*
(0.080) (0.079) (0.058) (0.057)
Language*North 0.186* 0.155 0.142 0.098
(0.11) (0.11) (0.087) (0.083)
FTA 0.359 0.737** 0.686*** 0.271***
(0.38) (0.33) (0.13) (0.10)
Colonial 1.557*** 1.505*** 1.091*** 0.528***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15)
Colonial*North -0.316 -0.926*** -0.0003 0.022
(0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20)
Legal 0.369*** 0.318*** 0.295*** 0.237***
(0.066) (0.064) (0.047) (0.046)
Legal*North 0.309*** 0.355*** 0.0136 0.038
(0.095) (0.093) (0.072) (0.069)
Border 0.489*** 0.499*** 0.631*** 0.773***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Border*North -0.553** -0.344 -0.405 2.917***
(0.25) (0.23) (0.27) (0.52)
Island -0.290** -0.186 -0.456*** -0.322***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Island*North -0.320*** -0.202* 0.0562 0.251***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.086) (0.083)
Landlocked -0.566*** -0.477** -0.699*** -0.633***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14)
Landlocked*North -0.308** -0.376*** 0.001 0.178**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.089) (0.087)
Currency Union 1.879*** 1.662*** 1.311*** 0.663***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
 (from bwrij) 0.242*** 0.761***
(0.063) (0.049)brij 0.465*** 0.452***
(0.079) (0.065)
Observations 9,711 9,711 12,795 12,795
R2 0.66 0.76
Notes: Exporter and Importer Fixed E¤ects; r = North/South
Religion is excluded variable and not reported; Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis
with country pair clustering *signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table A1 - List of the OECD (Northern) Countries
Country Year of Accession Country Year of Accession
AUSTRALIA 1971 KOREA 1996
AUSTRIA 1961 MEXICO 1994
BELGIUM-LUX 1961 NETHERLANDS 1961
CANADA 1961 NEW ZEALAND 1973
CZECH REPUBLIC 1995 NORWAY 1961
DENMARK 1961 POLAND 1996
FINLAND 1969 PORTUGAL 1961
FRANCE 1961 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2000
GERMANY 1961 SPAIN 1961
GREECE 1961 SWEDEN 1961
HUNGARY 1996 SWITZERLAND 1961
ICELAND 1961 TURKEY 1961
IRELAND 1961 UNITED KINGDOM 1961
ITALY 1962 UNITED STATES 1961
JAPAN 1964
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), www.oecd.org
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Table A2 - List of the Developing/Emerging (Southern) Countries
AFGHANISTAN COTE D IVOIRE ISRAEL PAKISTAN UNTD ARAB EM
ALBANIA CUBA JAMAICA PANAMA UNTD RP TNZ
ALGERIA CYPRUS JORDAN PAPUA N.GUIN URUGUYA
ANGOLA DJIBOUTI KENYA PARAGUAY VENEZUELA
ARGENTINA DOMINICAN RP KIRIBATI PERU VIETNAM
BAHAMAS ECUADOR KOREA DPR PHILLIPINES WESTERN SAHA
BAHRAIN EGYPT KUWAIT QATAR YEMEN
BANGLADESH EL SALVADOR LAOS REUNION ZAIRE
BARBADOS EQ. GUINEA LEBANON ROMANIA ZAMBIA
BELIZE ETHIOPIA LIBERIA RWANDA ZIMBABWE
BENIN FIJI LIBYA ARAB SAUDI ARABIA
BERMUDA FM USSR MADAGASCAR SENEGAL
BHUTAN FM YUGOSLAVI MALAWI SEYCHELLES
BOLIVIA FRENCH GUIAN MALAYSIA SIERRA LEONE
BRAZIL GABON MALDIVES SINGAPORE
BRUNEI GAMBIA MALI SOLOMON ISLD
BULGARIA GHANA MALTA SOMALIA
BURKINA FASO GREENLAND MAURITANIA SOUTH AFRICA
BURUNDI GUADELOUPE MAURITIUS SRI LANKA
CAMBODIA GUATEMALA MONGOLIA ST KITTS NEV
CAMEROON GUINEA MOROCCO SUDAN
CAYMAN ISLDS GUINEA-BISSA MOZAMBIQUE SURINAM
CENTRAL AFR. GUYANA MYANMAR SYRN ARAB RP
CHAD HAITI NEPAL TAIWAN
CHILE HONDURAS NETH ANTILLE THAILAND
CHINA HONG KONG NEW CALEDONI TOGO
COLOMBIA INDIA NICARAGUA TRINIDAD-TOB
COMOROS INDONESIA NIGER TUNISIA
CONGO IRAN NIGERIA TURKS CAICOS
COSTA RICA IRAQ OMAN UGANDA
Source: The HMR Data Set
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